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71 
Democracy, Race, and Multiculturalism in the 
Twenty-First Century: Will the Voting Rights Act 
Ever Be Obsolete? 
Sheryll D. Cashin* 
In 2005 our nation marked the fortieth anniversary of the passage 
of the Voting Rights Act.1 This comes on the heels of other august 
celebrations that remind us of what the civil rights revolution 
wrought: the fortieth anniversaries of the March on Washington and 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. 
Board of Education.2 Elsewhere I have written about the modern 
meaning of these milestones, and the challenges that remain.3 In this 
essay I reflect on the impact of the Voting Rights Act (“the Act”) and 
what growing racial diversity portends for American democracy in 
the twenty-first century. There is much to celebrate. Within a few 
years of the Act’s passage roughly a million new voters were 
registered in the South.4 In Mississippi, in the wake of the Act, black 
 
 * Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This essay expands on a 
lecture I gave as the University Distinguished Visiting Scholar, a Public Interest Law Speakers 
Series Lecturer, and the Black Law Students Association Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
Commemorative Speaker at Washington University in St. Louis on January 18, 2006. I would 
especially like to thank Karen Tokarz for honoring me with the invitation to lecture and visit, 
and the many faculty and students of numerous disciplines at Washington University who gave 
me feedback on these and other ideas. The stimulation was invaluable. I would also like to 
thank those of the law faculties at Georgetown and Boalt Hall who attended presentations of 
this paper. I am especially thankful to Mike Seidman and Ian Haney-Lopez for their insightful 
comments. Finally, many thanks to my research assistant, Elias Salameh, for his very helpful 
assistance in writing this essay.  
 1. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971–1974 (2000). 
 2. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 3. See, e.g., SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS 
ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM (2004) [hereinafter CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF 
INTEGRATION]; Sheryll D. Cashin, Shall We Overcome? Transcending Race, Class, and 
Ideology Through Interest Convergence, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 253 (2005) [hereinafter Cashin, 
Shall We Overcome?].  
 4. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 264 (2000); see also BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., 
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voter registration rose from less than 7% in 1964 to almost 60% in 
1968.5 As of 2004 the rate of black voter registration in Mississippi 
exceeded that of whites.6 Black voter registration and turnout rates 
are also approaching parity with that of whites at the national level.7 
The Act not only returned African Americans to their rightful place 
as active participants in democracy, it also greatly increased the ranks 
of blacks holding elective office. In 1965, there were three black 
members of Congress.8 Today there are forty-three.9 Nationwide, the 
number of black elected officials has risen from 1469 in 1970, the 
first year such statistics were collected, to a high of 9101 in 2001.10 
After the Act was amended in 1975 to protect Latino and other voters 
of color, the number of Latino elected officials also rose significantly, 
to nearly 6000 today, including twenty-seven in Congress.11  
 
MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 22 (1992).  
 5. GROFMAN, supra note 4, at 23. 
 6. See Bradley J. Schlozman, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Prepared Remarks for the 
Fortieth Anniversary of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, at 3 (July 27, 2005) (transcript available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/speeches/40_years_vra.pdf) (noting black Mississippian’s voter 
registration was 76.2% to 73.6% of white Mississipians). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Darryl Fears, 40 Years After Passage, Voting Law is in Dispute; Continued Need 
Debated as Expiration Nears, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2005, at A3. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Despite the successes, currently blacks account for only 2% of all elected officials in 
the United States. Amanda Ruggeri, Voting Rights Act’s Legacy; While Problems Exist, 
Progress Has Been Made, HERALD NEWS (Passaic County, N.J.), Aug. 7, 2005, at A16. In the 
states most directly regulated by the Act, black officials are typically aligned with the minority 
party. The states that must comply with the Act’s section 5 pre-clearance provision are: 
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and 
Virginia. See 28 C.F.R. § 51 (2004); 30 Fed. Reg. 9897 (Aug. 7, 1965); 40 Fed. Reg. 49,422 
(Oct. 22, 1975); 40 Fed. Reg. 43,746 (Sept. 23, 1975). Currently, Republicans hold the 
legislative branches in every one of these states except Louisiana. See Partisan Composition and 
Control, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/partycomp.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 
2006). Republicans control the executive branch in five of the nine pre-clearance states 
(Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas). See 2006 Governors: Party 
Control, http://www.rga.org/media/pdf/2006partycontrol.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2006). 
Meanwhile very few black elected officials in these states are Republicans. See generally Black 
GOP Elected Officials, http://www.nationalblackrepublicans.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=pages. 
Black%20GOP%20Elected%20Officials&x=2074429 (last visited Oct. 15, 2006) (showing 
very small numbers of Republican black elected officials in the pre-clearance states and, with 
the exception of two black Republicans in the Georgia legislature, none in the state 
legislatures). 
 11. John Lewis, Keeping the Polls Open, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2005, at A13. For example, 
the number of Latino elected officials in Arizona, California, Florida, New Mexico, New York, 
and Texas increased from 1280 in 1973 to 3677 in 1991. See Rodolfo O. de la Garza & Louis 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/6
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Several key provisions of the Act will expire in 2007 unless 
Congress votes to renew them. Among those provisions are section 
5’s requirement that the federal government approve any proposed 
voting changes in states and local jurisdictions with a documented 
history of discriminatory voting practices, and section 203’s 
requirement of bilingual voting assistance in communities with 
sufficient concentrations of non-English speakers.12 There is a rich 
voting rights literature debating whether such statutory provisions 
should be retained or how they should be reformed.13 Rather than 
 
DeSipio, Save the Baby, Change the Bathwater, and Scrub the Tub: Latino Electoral 
Participation After Seventeen Years of Voting Rights Act Coverage, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1479, 
1495 (1993). 
 12. See infra Part II.B (describing provisions of the Act). 
 13. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS 
IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (2d ed. 1995) (arguing that, given the high level of racially 
polarized voting, majority-minority districts are necessary under the American electoral 
system); PENDA D. HAIR & PAMELA S. KARLAN, ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, REDISTRICTING FOR 
INCLUSIVE DEMOCRACY (2000), available at http://advancementproject.org/RFD.pdf (arguing 
for the continued use of majority-minority districts as a means of maintaining voter turnout 
levels among minorities); CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE 
REPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CONGRESS (1993) (suggesting that although 
majority-minority districts may create some safe seats it actually hurts the careers of the 
individual politicians elected because they are not forced to form the biracial coalitions 
necessary to reach higher office); Kim Geron & James S. Lai, Beyond Symbolic Representation: 
A Comparison of the Electoral Pathways and Policy Priorities of Asian American and Latino 
Elected Officials, 9 ASIAN L.J. 41 (2002) (examining their study surveying the ways in which 
large numbers of Asian American and Latino candidates were elected and concluding that 
majority-minority districts are even more important for them then for black candidates); 
Bernard Grofman et al., Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and 
Some Empirical Evidence, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1383 (2001) (arguing for district specific analysis to 
determine what percentage of minority voters is needed to give them an equal opportunity to 
elect a candidate of their choice); Grant M. Hayden, Resolving the Dilemma of Minority 
Representation, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1589 (2004) (noting the normative considerations which 
support the use of the one person, one vote rule and arguing for its relaxation as a means of 
compensating for minority voting power); Kevin A. Hill, Does the Creation of Majority Black 
Districts Aid Republicans? An Analysis of the 1992 Congressional Elections in Eight Southern 
States, 57 J. POLITICS 384, 386–87 (1995) (noting that the three possible harms to Republicans 
through racial gerrymandering are either illegal or highly unlikely and arguing that such 
gerrymandering cost four white Democrats their seats in the election); Samuel Issacharoff, Is 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710 
(2004) (arguing that section 5 invites partisan enforcement by the Justice Department since 
most white Southerners vote Republican and most black Southerners vote Democratic); Spencer 
Overton, But Some Are More Equal: Race, Exclusion, and Campaign Finance, 80 TEX. L. REV. 
987 (2002) (noting that sections 2 and 5 of the Act could be tools to battle racial inequalities in 
the campaign finance system, but arguing that the Act does not adequately address the problem 
as a whole); Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself? Social Science 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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engage in the specifics of that debate, this essay examines the cultural 
impediments to meaningful participation in democracy on the part of 
those traditionally disenfranchised. What is the current tenor of race 
relations and how do American race relations manifest in the 
marketplace for votes? As the numbers of brown, yellow, red, and 
black people continue to grow exponentially in the United States, 
how will our race relations contribute to, or detract from, the health 
of American democracy? 
The enduring quandary of the Act, in my view, is that it attempts 
to ensure meaningful political participation for the traditionally 
disenfranchised while operating against a backdrop of still-divisive 
race relations. The historic cleavage between blacks and whites in the 
South remains a centuries-old conundrum, familiar to any student of 
American politics. Such racial divides are less pronounced nationally. 
But it remains the case that race and political affiliation are 
substantially correlated and that whites gravitate to the Republican 
Party while African Americans, Latinos, Asians, and Native 
Americans gravitate, in varying degrees, to the Democratic Party.14 
Ultimately, I conclude that as long as such pronounced racial 
cleavages remain evident in party affiliation, the risk of minority 
voter suppression is such that the Act’s race- and language-minority 
protections will continue to be necessary. At the same time, I 
acknowledge the unintended consequences of the Act and racial 
gerrymandering, arguing that unless and until we create a political 
discourse and legal context that encourages, rather than discourages, 
enduring interracial alliances, the health of American democracy 
remains insecure.  
Part I of this essay begins one hundred years before the passage of 
the Act, with Reconstruction. I briefly canvas the interracial alliances 
 
and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517 (2002) (arguing that changes in white 
voters’ willingness to vote for black candidates renders “coalitional” districts, where blacks 
make up a third or more of the voting population, sufficient to achieve the purposes of the Act); 
Michael J. Pitts, Let’s Not Call the Whole Thing Off Just Yet: A Response to Samuel 
Issacharoff’s Suggestion to Scuttle Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 84 NEB. L. REV 605 
(2005) (arguing that problems of partisanship are rare because civil servant lawyers, rather than 
political appointees, play a primary role in reviewing submissions). 
 14. See Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 
1201, 1223 (1996); see also infra Part III (discussing racial divides in the electorate). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/6
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of the Reconstruction and Redemption periods, underscoring that 
American democracy has been most responsive to the masses, 
including working class whites, when interracial alliances between 
whites and blacks commanded majority power. I then recount how a 
politics of white supremacy animated and perpetuated racial schisms 
between blacks and whites for a century in the South. Part II 
describes how the Act came to be passed, emphasizing the role of 
protest and coalition politics in its enactment, and the dramatic 
impact of the Act in fostering active participation by communities of 
color in American politics. Part III explores the opportunities and 
challenges presented by growing diversity of the electorate, 
underscoring the modern manifestations of historic racial divides in 
American politics. There is a continued, albeit less pronounced, strain 
of race loyalty in voting patterns that we have not yet vanquished.  
I. RECONSTRUCTION, “REDEMPTION,” AND THE POLITICS OF WHITE 
SUPREMACY 
A. Reconstruction  
To understand the continued role of racial schism in American 
politics, one must begin with Reconstruction, which featured 
interracial alliances between blacks and whites that, in turn, 
unleashed an explicit politics of white supremacy that would last 
nearly a century in the South. As most blacks lived in the South in the 
nineteenth century, the South initiated the course of race relations in 
America.15 Unfortunately, the South also introduced the phenomenon 
of racial solidarity into American politics.  
With the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, black 
males were constitutionally guaranteed the right to vote.16 Prior to 
this amendment the Military Reconstruction Act of 1867,17 which 
 
 15. See EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, THE RISE OF SOUTHERN REPUBLICANS 17–18 
(2002).  
 16. The amendment prohibits discrimination in voting “on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV. Females were not constitutionally 
guaranteed the right to vote until ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920. U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIX. 
 17. Reconstruction Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 428–429, 15 Stat. 2–4, 14–16 (1867). 
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allowed former Confederate states to be readmitted to the Union if 
they adopted new state constitutions that permitted universal male 
suffrage, catapulted newly emancipated slaves into an unmatched 
period of active democratic engagement. Most freedmen were poorly 
prepared for enfranchisement at this time, having been so recently 
granted even the legal right to read. Yet they were eager to learn, as 
the illiterate former slave Beverly Nash, sitting as a delegate to the 
South Carolina constitutional convention aptly articulated:  
I believe, my friends and fellow-citizens, we are not prepared 
for this suffrage. But we can learn. Give a man tools and let 
him commence to use them, and in time he will learn a trade. 
So it is with voting. We may not understand it at the start, but 
in time we shall learn to do our duty.18 
Given the chance, blacks voted en masse throughout 
Reconstruction. It is estimated that in many elections black turnout 
approached 90%—record levels that have yet to be surpassed.19 And, 
ironically, during the brief period from the onset of radical 
Reconstruction to the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment (from 
1867 to 1870), blacks actually had greater voting rights in the South 
than they did in much of the rest of the nation.20 South Carolina, in 
 
 18. JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 88 (2d ed. 1994). 
 19. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–
1877, at 291, 314 (2002). Nationally, the highest turnout of black voters, according to modern 
census records, was actually the year before the Voting Rights Act was passed. See Voting and 
Registration Data, http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/voting.html#hist (follow 
the “Table A-1, Excel” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). In 1964, in the wake of 
President Kennedy’s assassination, 58.5% of black voters turned out at the polls. Id. By 
comparison, in the 2004 presidential election, black voter turnout was 56%. Bob Kemper & 
Tom Baxter, Voting Rights Act: Renewal of Good Faith, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 5, 2005, at 
A1. 
 20. During the colonial period free blacks were permitted to vote almost everywhere. 
W.E. BURGHARDT DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION 7 (1935). Only in Georgia, South 
Carolina, and Virginia were they denied suffrage. Id. However, disenfranchisement was to 
sweep the nation in the latter eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In the South: Delaware, 
1792; Maryland, 1783; Louisiana, 1812; Mississippi, 1817; Alabama, 1819; Missouri, 1821; 
Florida and Texas, 1845. Id. In the North: blacks in Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire 
faced a property qualification; disenfranchisement came to Connecticut in 1814; blacks were 
disenfranchised in New Jersey from 1807–1820 and from 1847 until the passage of the 
Fifteenth Amendment in 1870; New York had disenfranchised its blacks in the eighteenth 
century, but permitted them to vote after 1821, subject to a $250 property qualification which 
whites did not face; and Pennsylvania disenfranchised its black population in 1838. Id. at 8. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/6
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1870, offered an example of what a large, motivated, black 
population could achieve. By actively striving for a greater share of 
the political spoils, South Carolina blacks were able to win three 
congressional seats, four of the state’s eight executive offices, and to 
place Jonathan J. Wright on the state Supreme Court—a feat not 
equaled in any other state during Reconstruction.21 While South 
Carolina was the exemplar, generally Reconstruction marked a period 
of robust black political representation. “Between 1870 and 1900, 
Southern states sent 700 African Americans to state legislatures and 
22 African Americans to Congress.”22  
Reconstruction also marked a period of bi-racial power sharing 
that may be without equal in our nation’s history. Even with massive 
turnout Southern blacks could not dictate results in most states.23 
Hence they were forced to form a coalition with Northern 
“carpetbaggers,” who constituted less than 2% of the population in 
the southern states, and “scalawags” (southern-born white 
Republicans).24 The coalition was imperfect; it was easy for the white 
Republican elite to take the black vote for granted, as voting for the 
Democrats would have been voting for their own 
disenfranchisement.25 While whites tended to make the most 
important political decisions and control state and local patronage 
systems, blacks did make important inroads.  
All of the constitutions adopted by southern states during 
Reconstruction guaranteed blacks civil and political rights. Each 
constitution ensconced the South’s first state-funded systems of free, 
 
Rhode Island bucked the trend and granted blacks suffrage in 1842. Id. In the territories, blacks 
were generally permitted to vote, but with statehood came disenfranchisement: Ohio, 1803; 
Indiana, 1816; Illinois, 1818; Michigan, 1837; Iowa, 1846; Wisconsin, 1848; Minnesota, 1858; 
and Kansas, 1861. Id. 
 21. FONER, supra note 19, at 352. 
 22. SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY 89 (2006).  
 23. Only in South Carolina (nearly 60%), Mississippi, and Louisiana (just over half) did 
blacks constitute a majority of the population in 1870; they made up between 40% and 50% in 
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and Virginia; over one third in North Carolina; and between one 
third and one quarter in Arkansas, Tennessee, and Texas. ERIC FONER, FREEDOM’S 
LAWMAKERS: A DIRECTORY OF BLACK OFFICEHOLDERS DURING RECONSTRUCTION, at xiii 
(1993). 
 24. FONER, supra note 19, at 296–97. 
 25. Id. at 330–31. 
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though not integrated, public education.26 Additionally, they 
abolished remnants of former regimes, such as imprisonment for 
debt, property qualifications for holding office and jury service, and 
viva voce voting.27 The four blacks who became State 
Superintendents of Education had significant authority in running the 
new school systems, and six blacks achieved the rank of Lieutenant 
Governor, presiding over state senates and occasionally, in the 
absence of their chief executive, acting as Governor.28  
The over 600 black representatives who were elected to state 
legislatures achieved concrete gains in public policy. Black 
lawmakers not only supported appropriations for schools, asylums, 
and social welfare, but also succeeded in enacting laws guaranteeing 
equal access to transportation and public accommodations throughout 
the Deep South.29 Generally, however, these state civil rights laws 
were not enforced.30 That said, blacks and whites in the South 
experienced integration most fully in the institutions of politics and 
government. They served together on juries, school boards, and city 
councils. The Republican Party provided a rare context where civic-
minded men of both races could work and interact together. Thus, 
despite its shortcomings and in stark contrast to the previous era of 
slavery and the regime of segregation to come, Reconstruction 
succeeded in cultivating a “standard of equal citizenship and a 
recognition of blacks’ right to a share of state services.”31 
 
 26. Id. at 319–20. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 354. 
 29. Id. at 365, 370. 
 30. Id. at 371. 
 31. Id. at 372. It was often from local (as opposed to state) elective posts that blacks had 
the greatest impact on their communities. Id. In virtually every county throughout the South, 
blacks held some of the local posts. Id. at 356. Three positions, in particular, were of great local 
importance: Justices of the Peace, who generally ruled on minor criminal offenses and the 
majority of civil cases; County Commissioners, who established tax rates, controlled local 
appropriations, and administered poor relief; and Sheriffs, who enforced the law, selected trial 
jurors, and carried out foreclosures and public sales of land. These were the jobs which, in the 
words of one Alabama lawyer, dealt with “the practical rights of the people, . . . our ‘business 
and lives.’” Id. at 355. During Reconstruction 228 blacks were justices of the peace, 111 served 
as county commissioners, and 41 were sheriffs. FONER, supra note 23, at xvii. These posts were 
key as the criminal justice system became a central battleground for black power. Quite often 
during Reconstruction whites attempted to use criminal law to restrict black freedom and to 
reinforce white dominance. See Donald G. Neiman, Black Political Power and Criminal 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/6
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B. Redemption 
Despite the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment, the promise of 
Reconstruction proved ephemeral for black voters. While the final 
curtain did not fall on Reconstruction until the Hayes-Tilden 
compromise of 1877,32 it had ended in fact in most states before that 
when Democrats regained control of state government, a process 
called “redemption.”33 Blacks did not cease to hold elective office 
with redemption. A few more blacks managed to serve in Congress 
and small numbers remained in legislatures throughout the South.34 A 
few areas in plantation counties remained bastions of black power, 
including the “‘black second’ Congressional district in eastern North 
Carolina[,] . . . South Carolina’s low country and Texas’ black 
belt.”35 From the end of Reconstruction until the final 
disenfranchisement at the turn of the century, however, blacks 
experienced a steady erosion of their political rights. Re-oppression 
came fastest in the Deep South; electoral fraud was widespread, the 
threat of violence hung heavily over black communities, and the 
Southern Republican Party largely disintegrated after 1877.36 These 
events were hastened by the congressional Hayes-Tilden 
compromise, in which the Democrats ceded the presidency to the 
Republican Rutherford B. Hayes in exchange for the Republicans 
withdrawing federal soldiers from the South.37 
 
Justice: Washington County, Texas, 1868–1884, 55 J.S. HIST. 391, 392 (1989). Once they began 
to win power within the judicial system, blacks quickly demanded color-blind justice. Id. 
Because those who operated the criminal justice system were popularly elected local officials 
whose actions were subject to scrutiny by their constituents, blacks’ ability to use political 
power was crucial to the outcome. Id. Additionally, one of the greatest changes wrought by 
black political power, with a profound influence on daily life, was the new presence of black on 
juries. Id. at 398. 
 32. FONER, supra note 19, at 581–82. 
 33. Taking the year in which an election produced simultaneous Democratic control of 
both houses of the legislature and the governorship the southern states were redeemed in the 
following years: Tennessee, 1870; Georgia, 1871; Texas, 1873; Virginia, 1873; Arkansas, 1874; 
Alabama, 1874; Mississippi, 1875; South Carolina, 1876; North Carolina, 1876; Florida, 1876; 
Louisiana, 1876. FONER, supra note 23, at xiii. 
 34. George H. White of North Carolina, who served in Congress from 1897–1901, was 
the last black to hold congressional office until the modern era. FONER, supra note 19, at 591. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See id. at 590–91. 
 37. See id. at 581–82. 
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Throughout Redemption southern states used legal and extra-legal 
methods, especially Klan-backed violence, to disenfranchise black 
voters.38 They evaded the reach of the Fifteenth Amendment by using 
race-neutral criteria. The definitive legal disenfranchisement of 
Southern blacks came with the adoption of new or amended state 
constitutions, beginning in the 1890s. The results of these legal and 
extra-legal methods of disenfranchisement were rather stark. In my 
home state of Alabama, for example, the Alabama Constitution of 
1901 employed, inter alia, grandfather clauses, literacy tests, and poll 
taxes, which ensured a dramatic reduction in both black and poor 
white voters.39 In 1890 the black electorate in Alabama stood at 
140,000, but by 1906 only forty-six blacks were registered in the 
entire state.40 
Democratic Senator Ben Tillman of South Carolina, the person 
most responsible for South Carolina’s disenfranchising 1895 
Constitution, attested to the virulent methods of Southern white 
supremacists when he stated: “We have done our level best. We have 
scratched our heads to find out how we could eliminate every last one 
of them. We stuffed ballot boxes. We shot them. We are not ashamed 
of it.”41 Such drastic tactics, and the resulting dismal levels of black 
voter participation would remain largely unchecked in the South until 
after World War II, when black voter registration began to rise in 
large Southern cities as racial attitudes began to improve, especially 
in upper and border Southern states.42 
C. The Politics of White Supremacy 
From the onset of Redemption, Democrats in the eleven states of 
the former confederacy aggressively cultivated a culture in which 
voting Democratic equated race loyalty for whites.43 As Senator 
 
 38. HANES WALTON, JR., BLACK REPUBLICANS: THE POLITICS OF THE BLACK AND TANS 
90 (1941). 
 39. Id. at 83. 
 40. Id. at 84.  
 41. RAYFORD W. LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO: FROM RUTHERFORD B. HAYES 
TO WOODROW WILSON 91 (2d ed. 1997). 
 42. See MIKE J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 187–89 (2004). 
 43. See WALTON, supra note 38, at 138. 
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Tillman put it, “We organized the Democratic [P]arty with one plank, 
and only one plank, namely, that ‘this is a white man’s country and 
white men must govern it.’”44 The white supremacy strategy was a 
direct response to the bi-racial coalitions of Reconstruction. The 
necessity of cultivating racial solidarity became even more pointed 
with the ascendancy of populism in the 1890s. The Populist 
movement, with its direct challenge to the economic caste system and 
industrial oligarchy, threatened to unite poor blacks and whites. In his 
insightful book, The Populist Moment, Lawrence Goodwyn describes 
a “sequential process of democratic movement-building” that, if 
successful, occurs in four stages: 
(1) the creation of an autonomous institution where new 
interpretations can materialize that run counter to those of 
prevailing authority . . . describe[d] as “the movement 
forming”; (2) the creation of a tactical means to attract masses 
of people—”the movement recruiting”; (3) the achievement of 
a heretofore culturally unsanctioned level of social analysis—
“the movement educating”; and (4) the creation of an 
institutional means whereby the new ideas, shared now by the 
rank and file of the mass movement, can be expressed in an 
autonomous political way—“the movement politicized.”45 
At each stage of movement building, Goodwyn argues, there are 
“[i]mposing cultural roadblocks” that will cause a loss of constituents 
who might otherwise be allies in the movement.46 A movement might 
not succeed at “recruiting” some folks, it may fail at “educating” 
others, and even those who are recruited and educated may decline to 
take the final step of autonomous political action.47 Above all, the 
“forces of orthodoxy” which typically occupy “the most culturally 
sanctioned command posts in . . . society, can be counted upon, out of 
self-interest, to oppose each stage of the sequential process—
 
 44. BLACK & BLACK, supra note 15, at 44. 
 45. LAWRENCE GOODWYN, THE POPULIST MOMENT, at xviii (1978). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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particularly the latter stages, when the threat posed by the movement 
has become clear to all.”48 
So it was the elite white regimes in the South who were directly 
threatened by the potential power of an alliance of poor black and 
white farmers. The National Farmers Alliance developed “the 
world’s first large-scale working class cooperative.”49 It succeeded in 
recruiting farmers by the millions and proceeded to educate them 
about economic hierarchy and privilege in America.50 When the 
Alliance’s efforts at economic self-help were defeated by the 
American industrial establishment, the Alliance turned to 
independent action, creating the Populist or “People’s Party,” which 
was active from 1877 to 1892.51 This new party was founded upon 
one of the most radical ideas in our nation’s history: “a farm-labor 
coalition of the ‘plain people’ that was interracial.”52  
The clarion call of white supremacy defeated the Populists in at 
least two ways. First, it created a specter of fear that prevented all but 
the most courageous blacks from publicly engaging in Populist Party 
organizing.53 The organizing of black farmers’ Alliance chapters was 
mostly clandestine.54 Second, racial solidarity tended to cleave blacks 
to the Republican Party, their historic protector from racial 
subordination, and whites to the Democratic Party, the claimed 
protector of white dominance.55 In the end, any possibilities for a 
sustained, interracial political alliance were defeated by exploiting 
whites’ fear of being dominated by Negroes. The Populists 
themselves sometimes feared explicitly seeking the black vote 
because Democrats, in their zeal to pass election laws to 
disenfranchise blacks, might vindictively or intentionally 
disenfranchise poor whites as well.56 “When it became evident that 
white factions would find themselves competing for the black vote 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at xx. 
 50. Id. at xx–xxi. 
 51. Id. at xxi. 
 52. Id. at 118. 
 53. Id. at 122–23. 
 54. See id.  
 55. See id. at 121–22, 189; WALTON, supra note 38, at 138. 
 56. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A 
HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 285 (8th ed. 2000).  
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and thus frequently give blacks the balance of power,” whites of all 
classes ultimately coalesced around the idea of complete 
disenfranchisement of blacks.57 But, as mechanisms like poll taxes 
became constitutional requirements, white solidarity often had the 
effect of disenfranchising poor whites as well.58 Indeed, Jim Crow 
segregation laws were a form of appeasement for poor whites. If they 
could not share fully in voting suffrage or the spoils of an economic 
caste system, then the racial caste system of Jim Crow would accord 
them the psychological balm of legally sanctioned racial 
superiority.59 
In some states the Populists did succeed in forming a “fusion” 
alliance with remnants of old Republican organizations. In 1894 such 
an alliance gained control of the North Carolina legislature.60 The 
“Fusionist” legislature of 1895 repealed the Democrats’ restrictive 
voting requirements, enabling blacks to reassert political influence.61 
Many counties had black deputy sheriffs and the city of Wilmington 
had fourteen black police officers.62 The black and white citizens of 
Wilmington, who had the effrontery to form an alliance that elected 
black and white progressives to office throughout city government, 
were rewarded with a vicious coup and race riot in 1898.63 As 
recently recounted by the Wilmington Race Riot Commission, white 
supremacists carefully planned the overthrow of a popularly elected 
government, banished prominent blacks and whites from the city, and 
killed scores of black citizens.64 At the state level, the Democrats 
broke up the interracial Populist-Republican alliance with an 
aggressive campaign of white supremacy and violent deployment of 
“Red Shirts” that kept blacks away from the polls.65 They reclaimed 
the North Carolina state government, stripped black citizens of the 
 
 57. Id. at 286. 
 58. Id. at 286–87. 
 59. See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS 44 (2004). 
 60. See FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 56, at 285. 
 61. See WALTON, supra note 38, at 89. 
 62. FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 56, at 285.  
 63. 1898 WILMINGTON RACE RIOT COMMISSION—FINAL REPORT, May 31, 2006,  
http://www.ah.dcr.state.nc.us/1898-wrrc/report/report.htm; see also Brent Staples, When 
Democracy Died in Wilmington, N.C., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006, at 13. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See WALTON, supra note 38, at 90. 
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right to vote, and brought this rare example of bi-racial democracy to 
a close.66 
Not surprisingly, pogroms like those of Wilmington, North 
Carolina; Rosewood, Florida; and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; and 
the decades-long practice of lynching, cowed many, if not most, 
Southern blacks into acceptance of their banishment from the 
political sphere. Because of the durable force of white supremacy 
politics, the interracial cooperation of late-nineteenth century 
Wilmington, North Carolina would not be seen again in the South for 
at least six decades. The Southern Democratic Party shaped the 
segregationist identities of most white Southerners. In 1940, for 
example, 98% of white Southerners supported racial segregation.67 
“For most whites living in most parts of the South during the first half 
of the twentieth century, being a Democrat and believing 
wholeheartedly in white supremacy were essential elements of their 
identities.”68 
Southern whites also paid a high price for a politics premised 
upon white supremacy. As John Hope Franklin surmised: 
Since all other issues were subordinated to the issue of ‘the 
Negro,’ it became impossible to have free and open discussion 
of problems affecting all the people. There could be no two-
party system, for the temptation to call upon blacks to decide 
between opposing factions would be too great. Interest in 
politics waned to a point at which only professionals, who 
skillfully deflected the interest from issues to races, were 
concerned with public life.69 
The end result was an impoverished, pale imitation of democracy, 
one that placed government heavily under the control of a small elite 
class of propertied white males. 
 
 66. See id. at 89–91.  
 67. Id. 
 68. BLACK & BLACK, supra note 15, at 45. 
 69. FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 56, at 291. 
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II. RESTORING DEMOCRACY: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
A. The Impetus for the Act  
When 600 people walked peaceably over the Edmund Pettus 
Bridge in Selma, Alabama on March 7, 1965, to begin a fifty-four-
mile march to Montgomery in protest of black citizens’ inability to 
register to vote, little did they know that their efforts would result in 
one of the most transformative pieces of legislation in the history of 
the United States. Infamously, the marchers never made it past the 
mid-point of the bridge. When confronted by police and state 
troopers wielding billy clubs, tear gas, and the might of horses, this 
strong, multi-racial band of protesters knelt to pray. The television 
footage of peaceful protestors being bludgeoned burnished the image 
of Bloody Sunday in the minds of millions of Americans, instantly 
altering the nation’s conscience and the political saliency of robust 
federal voting rights legislation.70  
Before this moment, tepid federal voting rights protections had 
been enacted in 1957 and 1960.71 These provisions, however, were 
no match for the virulent legal and extra-legal methods used in the 
era of Jim Crow to deny African Americans their constitutionally 
guaranteed right to vote.72 Prior efforts to enact more robust federal 
voting rights protections had not succeeded.73 As with the Civil 
 
 70. See JOHN LEWIS WITH MICHAEL D’ORSO, WALKING WITH THE WIND: A MEMOIR OF 
THE MOVEMENT 331–32 (1998); Michael E. Ross, The Voting Rights Act Turns 40, MSNBC, 
Aug. 31, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8487686 (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). 
 71. See Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 637 (codified at 40 U.S.C. 
§§ 1971–1973 (2000)). The Act of 1957 created the Civil Rights Division within the 
Department of Justice and the Commission on Civil Rights. Id. It gave the Attorney General 
authority to intervene in and institute lawsuits seeking injunctive relief against violations of the 
Fifteenth Amendment. Id. The 1960 Act empowered the Division to sue on behalf of citizens 
denied the right to vote on account of race and permitted federal courts to appoint voting 
referees to conduct voter registration following a judicial finding of voting discrimination. Id. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 contained some relatively minor voting-related provisions. Id. 
 72. Overall, this anti-discrimination regime, which relied on individual lawsuits, did not 
affect systemic change. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327–28 (1966) 
(“Congress had found that case-by-case litigation was inadequate to combat widespread and 
persistent discrimination in voting, because of the inordinate amount of time and energy 
required to overcome the obstructionist tactics invariably encountered in these lawsuits.”). 
 73. See, e.g., Lyndon B. Johnson, U.S. President, Special Message to the Congress: The 
American Promise (Mar. 15, 1965), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED 
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Rights Act of 1964, which resulted not from the leadership of 
political elites, but from sustained, organized grassroots protests that 
demanded a different social order from political elites,74 the Voting 
Rights Act came about because of the demands of organized protest. 
Prior to Bloody Sunday grassroots citizen movements had sought to 
build popular pressure on Southern governors and local officials to 
enable blacks to register. The Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference and others civil rights organizations sponsored efforts to 
advocate for the enfranchisement of blacks including marches, rallies, 
boycotts, petitions, and lawsuits.75 Bloody Sunday was the turning 
point for these efforts. Selma was chosen as the starting place for a 
symbolic march to Montgomery in part because organizers knew the 
sheriff had the kind of “Bull Connor-like proclivities” that would 
garner national media attention.76 Local law enforcement behaved as 
predicted, resulting in several injuries, including the fracturing of a 
young John Lewis’ skull and the death of a white Unitarian minister 
from Boston named James Reeb.77 Protests denouncing the violence 
ensued in over eighty cities. On March 9, 1965, Dr. Martin Luther 
King led another march to the bridge that was blocked by police.78 
On March 21, 1965, with court ordered protection, 3000 marchers 
completed the trek from Selma to Montgomery, their numbers 
swelling to 25,000, under the glare of worldwide press coverage.79 
President Lyndon B. Johnson responded quickly to the tragedy. 
He ordered then-Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach to prepare 
“the goddamnedest toughest voting rights bill possible,”80 and 
delivered a nationally televised address to a special joint session of 
 
STATES, 1966, at 281–87 (transcript available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives. 
hom/speeches.hom/650315.asp) (noting in an address to a joint session to Congress, “The last 
time a President sent a civil rights bill to the Congress it contained a provision to protect voting 
rights in Federal elections.” When Congress passed the bill eight months later and sent it to the 
President for his signature “the heart of the voting provision had been eliminated.”).  
 74. See Cashin, Shall We Overcome?, supra note 3, at 260–66.  
 75. See KEYSSAR, supra note 4, at 258.  
 76. See KLARMAN, supra note 42, at 400. 
 77. See LEWIS WITH D’ORSO, supra note 70, at 326–30, 336, 338. 
 78. See Janai S. Nelson, Op-Ed., 40 Years After Bloody Sunday, Challenges Remain, 
MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 13, 2005. 
 79. See id.  
 80. HOWELL RAINES, MY SOUL IS RESTED: MOVEMENT DAYS IN THE DEEP SOUTH 
REMEMBERED 337 (1977). 
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Congress that stressed the intertwined destinies of black and white 
America.81 Among other things, he stated: 
 At times history and fate meet at a single time in a single 
place to shape a turning point in man’s unending search for 
freedom. So it was at Lexington and Concord. So it was a 
century ago at Appomattox. So it was last week in Selma, 
Alabama. 
 . . . . There is no Negro problem. There is no Southern 
problem. There is no Northern problem. There is only an 
American problem. 
 . . . .  
 . . . What happened in Selma is part of a far larger 
movement . . . . It is the effort of American Negroes to secure 
for themselves the full blessings of American life.  
 Their cause must be our cause too. Because it is not just 
Negroes, but really it is all of us, who must overcome the 
crippling legacy of bigotry and injustice.  
 And we shall overcome.82 
The Voting Rights Act became law five months later with bipartisan 
support. 
B. Key Provisions of the Act 
Section 2 of the Act, as amended, prohibits any voting 
“qualification . . . prerequisite . . . standard, practice, or procedure” 
that “results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of 
the United States to vote on account of race or color,”83 also known 
as “vote dilution.”84 This provision, which tracks the language of the 
 
 81. Lyndon B. Johnson, U.S. President, Special Message to the Congress: The American 
Promise (Mar. 15, 1965), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1966, 
at 281–87 (transcript available at http://lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/ 
650315.asp). 
 82. Lyndon B. Johnson, supra note 73. 
 83. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000). 
 84. Jocelyn Benson, Note, Turning Lemons into Lemonade: Making Georgia v. Ashcroft 
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Fifteenth Amendment,85 has proven immensely successful in 
realizing the potential of that Reconstruction amendment, in part 
because discriminatory intent is not required to establish a violation.86 
Perhaps even more important, in light of the virulence of the tactics 
of disenfranchisement and of white supremacy in the South, is the 
section 5 “pre-clearance” requirement. This section, which applies 
only to those states and local jurisdictions with the worst histories of 
race-based voting discrimination and low turnout, requires covered 
jurisdictions to submit all proposed changes to voting qualifications 
and procedures to the federal government for approval before those 
changes can go into effect.87 At the time of its passage both 
opponents and proponents of the Act understood that section 5’s pre-
clearance provisions would fundamentally and radically shift the 
balance of power from the states to the federal government.88 
In 1970 Congress extended the pre-clearance provision for 
another five years and, over the next four years, expanded it to cover 
 
the Mobile v. Bolden of 2007, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 485, 487 (2004).  
 85. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 86. The section was weakened when the Supreme Court read the section to require a 
discriminatory intent rather than merely a discriminatory result. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 
U.S. 55 (1980). Congress chose to legislatively overrule this holding by explicitly removing the 
intent requirement in its 1982 reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act. See Benson, supra note 
84, at 487–88. 
 87. Specifically, section 5 requires the Attorney General or the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia to pre-clear any proposed changes to any voting qualification 
or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting, in the 
covered jurisdictions. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000); see also Rodríguez, supra note 75, at 772. 
Initially, the pre-clearance provision applied to: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
South Carolina, Virginia, and several counties in North Carolina. 30 Fed. Reg. 9897 (Aug. 7, 
1965). The Supreme Court applied this section to changes that qualitatively diluted voter power 
as well as those that disenfranchised minority voters, thus providing a potent weapon to attack 
more subtle forms of discrimination. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 
(1969). 
 88. Upon signing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, after a two month filibuster by Southern 
Democrats, President Lyndon B. Johnson reportedly stated to a colleague, “There goes the 
South for a generation.” Timothy Noah, Forget the South, Democrats, SLATE, Jan. 27, 2004, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2094552. Johnson’s prescient prediction that most Southern whites 
would leave the Democratic Party as a result of the radical intervention of the federal 
government into Southern prerogatives did come to pass with the realignment of the South to 
the Republican column. See also infra Part III.A. See generally DAVID LUBLIN, THE 
REPUBLICAN SOUTH: DEMOCRATIZATION AND PARTISAN CHANGE (2004) (discussing the 
gradual shift of Southern Democrats to the left and the resulting move of white candidates and 
voters to the Republican Party).  
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a few counties in California and New York and ten municipalities in 
New Hampshire because these areas imposed voting tests and had 
low voter registration or participation.89 Congress amended the Act 
again in 1975, this time extending the pre-clearance provision for 
seven more years and expanding it to cover Alaska, Arizona, Texas, 
and several counties in California, Florida, New York, and South 
Dakota as well as a few localities in Michigan.90 All of these areas 
had significant populations of language minorities and low voter 
turnout ostensibly correlating with their use of English-only 
materials.91 As with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, anti-discrimination 
protections borne of a concern with Jim Crow-style discrimination 
against blacks in the South were now being expanded to protect other 
status groups.92 
In addition to expanding the geographic reach of the preclearance 
provision, the 1975 amendments required areas with large numbers of 
language minorities to translate registration forms and ballots, to 
recruit bilingual registration clerks and poll workers who will give 
oral assistance, and to publicize the bilingual assistance that is 
available.93 In 1982 Congress renewed the pre-clearance 
requirements for another twenty-five years and the language 
assistance requirements for another ten years, which Congress 
extended yet again in 1982 for fifteen years.94 As a result, as stated 
above, both the pre-clearance and language assistance provisions will 
expire in 2007 if not reauthorized. 
Clearly, the Act has had a tremendous, transformative impact, not 
just for African Americans but also for Latinos, Asians, and Native 
 
 89. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970) 
(codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. §§ 1971–1973 (2000)); see 36 Fed. Reg. 5809 (1971); 39 
Fed. Reg. 16912 (1974). 
 90. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 402 (codified as 
amended at 40 U.S.C. §§ 1971–1973 (2000)); see 40 Fed. Reg. 43,746 (Sept. 23, 1975); 40 Fed. 
Reg. 49,422 (Oct. 22, 1975). 
 91. See 40 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(3) (2000) (stating the test for coverage under the provision). 
 92. See Cashin, Shall We Overcome?, supra note 3, at 267–68 (describing expansions to 
the Civil Rights Act). 
 93. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f). 
 94. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(6), 96 Stat. 131, 
133 (1982) (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. §§ 1971–1973 (2000)); Voting Rights Language 
Assistance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-344, 106 Stat. 921 (1992). 
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Americans.95 Officials in Buffalo County, South Dakota, for 
example, can no longer pack nearly all of the county’s Native 
American majority into a single voting district so as to deprive them 
of control on the three-member county commission.96 In 2001, 
because the language assistance provisions of the Act were invoked 
to mandate Chinese-language ballots in New York City, more than 
100,000 Asian American citizens who were not fluent in English 
were able to vote and help elect John Liu, the first Asian American 
member of the New York City Council.97 In the “Immigrant City” of 
Lawrence, Massachusetts, the Latino majority now benefits from 
bilingual voting information, ballots, and poll workers; a schools 
committee that elects most of its members by district rather than city-
wide; a bilingual voting registrar; and a full time bilingual staff 
member in the city’s elections office.98 These hard-won protections 
have not just resulted in greater Latino voter participation but they 
have also forced candidates and officials of all backgrounds to 
consider the perspectives of all of Lawrence’s citizens.99 These are 
but a few examples of the thousands of voting rights cases that have 
ensued since the Act’s passage. They testify to the Act’s direct role in 
enabling previously marginalized peoples to be respected, full 
participants in the political process. 
C. Growing Diversity: The Opportunities and Challenges  
A consistent theme or tension in voting rights scholarship regards 
the issue of unintended consequences for American democracy. For 
example, racial gerrymandering that creates both majority-minority 
districts and “safe” Republican, mostly-white districts reduces the 
number of competitive races and contributes to a balkanized 
electorate in which politicians and citizens have less incentive to 
consider collective as opposed to parochial interests, or to build 
bridges across boundaries of race.100 In the next part of this essay I 
 
 95. See supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text.  
 96. See LEWIS, supra note 11. 
 97. Id.  
 98. See OVERTON, supra note 22, at 126–29. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See, e.g., GUINIER, supra note 13 (suggesting cumulative voting as a programmatic 
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argue that such tension inherent in voting rights debates is of a piece 
with a tortured racial history in which political allegiances have been 
cultivated explicitly and implicitly around notions of racial loyalty. 
America’s growing racial complexity, however, presents both 
opportunities and challenges for transcending these historic tensions.  
In 1960 about 89% of the population of the United States was 
white, 11% was black, and the small remainder was composed of 
other races.101 Today, Latinos outnumber African Americans and 
demographers predict that we will become a majority-minority nation 
shortly after mid-century.102 Latinos are our fastest growing 
demographic group, followed by Asians.103 I see both promise and 
peril in these trends. On the one hand, there is some evidence to 
suggest that race relations are improved in environments where not 
just two, but three or more demographic groups are forced to 
coexist.104 In theory it should be easier for our nation to move beyond 
the tortured “black-white” dynamic of American relations as the 
racial spectrum broadens. Even in a context of extensive racial 
gerrymandering, at the state and national level, increasingly political 
parties will be forced to reckon with racial complexity and attempt to 
be competitive in attracting a diverse electorate. On the other hand, 
growing racial complexity may make it easier for politicians and 
political parties to exploit racial fears of the still-dominant white 
majority, or of any voter who may harbor misgivings or worse about 
a different demographic group. This is the signature challenge that 
multiculturalism presents for American democracy in the twenty-first 
century.  
 
reform that might increase the influence of minority voters and hopefully create a healthier 
democracy than a winner-take-all system in which voters are often gerrymandered into racially 
identifiable districts). 
 101. See Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals 
by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for the United States, Regions, 
Divisions, and States tbl.A-8 (Population Div., U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper No. 56, 
2002), available at http://www.census.gov/population/documentation/twps0056/twps0056.pdf. 
 102. See CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION, supra note 3, at 90. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See id. at 52–57 (describing “Multicultural Islands,” neighborhoods with three or 
more races, a diverse housing mix, and a host of civic organizations that build relationships and 
trust across boundaries of race and class).  
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III. MODERN RACIAL DIVISIONS IN THE ELECTORATE 
The civil rights revolution has done much to expand opportunity 
and enhance race relations in this country.105 That said, the central 
narrative of racial cleavage that dominated Southern politics in the 
twentieth century and made the Act necessary, continues to be 
evident in voting patterns both in the South and nationally. Both 
political parties, Republicans and Democrats, share the blame for 
exploiting and perpetuating racial divisions. Fortunately, we have 
transcended the era when overt appeals to white supremacy were 
accepted as legitimate political discourse. For nearly a century in the 
Deep South many Democrats successfully deployed this explicit 
racist strategy. The Republican Party, on the other hand, was founded 
on an antislavery platform.106 Republicans were the champions of 
Radical Reconstruction and were the authors of the Thirteenth, 
Forteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.107 They offered our nation its 
first example of how an inclusive, interracial political coalition could 
command majority power. An interracial coalition brought 
Republicans back in power in 1896 with the election of President 
McKinley and the same interracial coalition maintained Republicans 
in power until the Great Depression, when blacks, working class 
whites, labor, and other groups coalesced around Franklin 
Roosevelt’s New Deal.108 Moderate Republicans also made civil 
rights legislation possible in the 1960s; they provided the additional 
votes needed to overcome the staunch opposition of Southern 
segregationist Democrats.109 At the same time, we should not forget 
 
 105. For example, the black poverty rate has fallen from 72% in 1950 to 24% in 2002. See 
Cashin, Shall We Overcome?, supra note 3, at 259 (citing 2002 census data); Michael B. Katz 
& Mark J. Stern, Poverty in Twentieth-Century America 34 (America at the Millenium Project, 
Working Paper No. 7, 2001) (citing a 72% poverty rate for non-Hispanic blacks in 1950). One 
indicia of improved race relations is the professed willingness of non-blacks to share their life 
space (their neighborhood) with blacks. Between 1958 and 1997 the percentage of non-blacks 
who said in public opinion polls that they would move if great numbers of blacks moved into 
their neighborhood fell from 80% to 18%. CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION, supra note 
3, at 11–12. 
 106. See FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 56, at 218; JOHN B. JUDIS & RUY TEIXEIRA, THE 
EMERGING DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY 13 (2002). 
 107. See FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 56, at 252–53. 
 108. See ALEXANDER P. LAMIS, SOUTHERN POLITICS IN THE 1990S, at 393 (1999).  
 109. See, e.g., Cashin, Shall We Overcome?, supra note 3, at 260–68 (recounting the 
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that after the civil rights revolution, the Republican Party pursued a 
“southern strategy” that was explicitly premised on exploiting racial 
divisions.110 And it worked.  
A. Southern Realignment and Continued Divisions 
Nineteen sixty-four was a watershed year in American politics. 
“When the Republican [P]arty nominated Arizona Senator Barry 
Goldwater—one of the few northern senators who had opposed the 
Civil Rights Act—as their presidential candidate in 1964, the party 
attracted many racist [S]outhern whites . . . [and] permanently 
alienated African-American voters.”111 This was the first time since 
the inception of the Republican Party that more Southern whites 
voted Republican than Democratic, a pattern that has been repeated 
in every subsequent presidential election.112 The civil rights 
movement was the catalyst for this shift. To this day, elections in the 
South tend to separate vast majorities of blacks into the Democratic 
column and smaller majorities of whites into the Republican 
column.113 Two-party politics finally emerged in the South but it did 
not extinguish a centuries long racial narrative of virtually continuous 
conflict between Southern whites and blacks—through the eras of 
slavery, segregation, and white supremacy.114  
But racial divisions in the electorate are not limited to the South. 
In the South and elsewhere the emergence of blacks as committed 
Democrats has put seemingly permanent pressure on Republicans to 
woo large white majorities.115 An earlier generation of Southern 
Republican candidates often could not resist the urge to use explicit 
or coded racial appeals to achieve this goal, a strategy that spilled 
 
coalition politics that led to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 110. See infra text accompanying notes 115–26. 
 111. BLACK & BLACK, supra note 15, at 4. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 244. Studies show that our tortured history of racial opposition has greatly 
shaped the political identity of African Americans, underscoring why the vast majority of 
blacks vote Democratic, regardless of economic status. See generally MICHAEL C. DAWSON, 
BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICS (1994) (discussing the 
effect of race and class on politics and policy). 
 115. See BLACK & BLACK, supra note 15, at 22–23. 
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over into national politics. Kevin Phillips was quite prescient when 
he suggested in his seminal 1969 book The Emerging Republican 
Majority that it was possible for Republicans to simply cede the 
minority vote to Democrats and still win elections.116 This was a 
viable strategy when voters of color were only about one-tenth of the 
electorate.117 Strom Thurmond, in 1948, and George Wallace, in 
1964 and 1968, who both ran as segregationist “Dixiecrats,” 
succeeded in peeling white voters from the Democratic column.118 In 
his campaigns for the presidency, Republican Richard Nixon, in turn, 
would court white voters with race coded “law and order” 
messages.119  
Ronald Reagan engaged in a similar kind of race-coded politics 
although he was adept at embedding racial symbolism within 
respectable traditions of economic conservatism. In 1980 he chose 
the small town of Philadelphia, Mississippi, where civil rights 
workers Michael Schwerner, Andrew Goodman, and James Chaney 
were murdered, as the place to launch his post-convention 
presidential campaign.120 His own pollster emphatically advised him 
not to appear in a town that was a symbol of murderous racism to 
many.121 He rejected that advice, probably understanding that the 
powerful symbolism would work in his favor with many white 
voters. In his speech he stated “I believe in states rights,” a code 
phrase that had been used by Southern segregationists to defend their 
opposition to civil rights and desegregation.122 On the campaign 
stump Reagan railed against the “welfare queen” in Chicago who 
reportedly had “eighty names, thirty addresses, twelve social security 
cards” and tax free income of “over one hundred and fifty thousand 
dollars.”123 While I am not suggesting that Reagan was a racist his 
actions and words sent an unmistakable message of white racial 
 
 116. See JUDIS & TEIXEIRA, supra note 106, at 61 (citing KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, THE 
EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY 446 (1969)). 
 117. See JUDIS & TEIXEIRA, supra note 106, at 61. 
 118. See, e.g., id. at 17–19 (describing how the Republican Party benefited from the 
explicitly racist campaigns of George Wallace, inheriting Wallace voters). 
 119. See id. at 57. 
 120. See BLACK & BLACK, supra note 15, at 216–17. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id.; see also JUDIS & TEIXEIRA, supra note 106, at 21. 
 123. JUDIS & TEIXEIRA, supra note 106, at 25. 
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solidarity.124 On the key question that had dominated Southern 
politics for more than a century, “Whose side are you on?”, there was 
no doubt as to how Reagan was perceived in the South.125 He 
solidified the Republican Party’s hold on Goldwater and Wallace 
supporters and, because of his popularity as President, hastened an 
era where Republicans no longer had to engage in explicit racial 
appeals to attract large numbers of white voters.126 His coded appeals 
around a cluster of race-oriented issues resonated not just in the 
South but also in the ethnic suburbs of the Midwest and Northeast. 
“In many of those areas, the two parties became identified with their 
different racial compositions—the Republicans as the ‘white party’ 
and the Democrats as the ‘black party.’”127 Such identification 
created no incentive for racial reconciliation and great incentive for 
Republicans to create political majorities by dividing whites from 
blacks.128  
In the 1980s the nation would witness Republican candidates from 
Jesse Helms to George H. W. Bush use racial wedge issues that 
played on the racial anxieties, fears, and frustrations of whites.129 A 
cluster of race-oriented issues like affirmative action, busing, crime, 
and capital punishment helped Republicans make inroads with white 
working class voters who had been dependable Democrats from 1932 
to 1960.130 The stagflation of the 1970s and economic restructurings 
of the 1980s fueled these voters’ resentments about race. Indeed, in 
some blue-collar areas race seemed to be the predominant factor in 
whites’ transition from the Democratic to Republican column. For 
example, Macomb County, Michigan, just north of Detroit, went 
from being the most Democratic suburban county in the country in 
1960, voting 63% for Kennedy that year, to voting 66% for Reagan in 
1984.131 In focus groups, Democratic pollster Stanley Greenberg 
found racial resentment animated much of the switch: 
 
 124. See BLACK & BLACK, supra note 15, at 216–17. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. 
 127. JUDIS & TEIXEIRA, supra note 106, at 170. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. at 62–64, 170–71. 
 130. Id. at 62–64. 
 131. Id. at 22. 
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‘Blacks constitute the explanation for their vulnerability for 
almost everything that has gone wrong in their lives.’ . . . 
[They see] the federal government ‘as a black domain where 
whites cannot expect reasonable treatment.’ This view ‘shapes 
their attitudes toward government, particularly spending and 
taxation and the linkage between them. There was a 
widespread sentiment . . . that the Democratic [P]arty 
supported giveaway programs, that is, programs aimed 
primarily at minorities.’132 
Such electoral defeats in the 1980s led centrist Democrats in the 
1990s to take affirmative steps to inoculate their party from covert 
racial appeals.133 Bill Clinton is lauded by some for having 
successfully countered the Democrats image as the party of black 
people.134 Among other tactics, Clinton advocated welfare reform and 
the death penalty, and engaged in a much-publicized spat with the 
Reverend Jesse Jackson on the eve of the 1992 Democratic 
convention.135  
Hopefully, coded racial appeals are no longer deemed acceptable 
or beneficial in American politics, recent skirmishes over the 
Confederate flag notwithstanding.136 Race-coded politics have 
backfired in some recent state elections.137 In the marketplace for 
votes most Republican candidates now emphasize their economic and 
social conservatism.138 Our country is much less racially polarized 
 
 132. Id. at 22–23. 
 133. See id. at 29, 64. 
 134. See id.; WILLIAM A. GALSTON & ELAINE C. KAMARCK, THIRD WAY, THE POLITICS 
OF POLARIZATION 5 (2005), http://www.third-way.com/products/16 (follow the “Download 
PDF” hyperlink). 
 135. See JUDIS & TEIXEIRA, supra note 106, at 64; see also CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF 
INTEGRATION, supra note 3, at 278–82 (discussing Clinton’s “triangulation” strategies and his 
maneuvers around race). 
 136. See JUDIS & TEIXEIRA, supra note 106, at 113 (citing Mississippi in 2001 and South 
Carolina in 1997 as examples of states that had “raging controversies over whether to fly a 
Confederate flag, a symbol of Southern racism, over their state capitols” and noting this as 
evidence that racial issues continue to dominate over economic issues in the political cultures of 
some states).  
 137. See JUDIS & TEIXEIRA, supra note 106, at 171–73 (recounting the negative reaction 
among voters to the use of race-coded issues by Republican gubernatorial candidates in New 
Jersey and Virginia). 
 138. See BLACK & BLACK, supra note 15, at 13. 
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than it used to be. One can find evidence of an improved racial 
climate in empirical studies examining the willingness of whites to 
vote for black candidates.139 In the 1996 elections, because of 
Supreme Court rulings casting suspicion on majority-black districts, 
five black congressional incumbents were forced to run for re-
election in districts that had been redrawn from majority-black to 
majority-white.140 All of them ran in Southern districts that ranged 
from 35% to 45% black, and all five of them won, demonstrating that 
interracial alliances are not dead in Southern politics.141  
However, one can also find studies suggesting that white voters 
are not yet color blind in their voting preferences.142 Voting rights 
scholars debate the significance of these studies and their 
implications for the continued necessity of voting rights protections. 
Reasonable people can disagree on the existence or degree of racial 
discrimination exhibited in the voting booth against candidates of 
color, but the evidence of a racial cleavage in partisan identification 
is unmistakable. While racial divisions may be more pronounced in 
the South, which has endured a unique racial history, this cleavage 
shows up in national elections as well. The New Deal model of 
politics, which pitted a winning coalition of economically marginal 
 
 139. See, e.g., Benjamin Highton, White Voters and African American Candidates for 
Congress, 26 POL. BEHAV. 1 (2004) (analyzing exit poll data from 1996 and 1998 House of 
Representatives elections and finding very little evidence that white voters are averse to black 
candidates). Highton’s article also cites other studies conducted since 2000 which similarly find 
little evidence that black candidates receive less support than white candidates among whites. 
Id. at 5; see also Tim R. Sass & Stephen L. Mehay, The Voting Rights Act, District Elections, 
and the Success of Black Candidates in Municipal Elections, 38 J. L. & ECON. 367 (1995) 
(finding that while district elections aided black candidates in the early 1980s, over the 
following decade blacks achieved substantially greater success in at-large elections likely due to 
a reduction in the racial polarization of voters). But see infra note 142.  
 140. LAMIS, supra note 108, at 387. 
 141. Id. The five successful black incumbents were Cynthia McKinney and Sanford Bishop 
of Georgia; Bernice Johnson and Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas; and Corrine Brown of Florida. 
Id. at 387 n.16. Cleo Fields of Louisiana, whose district was also redrawn from majority black 
to majority white, did not seek reelection, opting instead to make an unsuccessful bid for 
governor. Id. 
 142. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on 
Black Representation in Southern State Legislatures, 16 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 111, 111 (1991) 
(finding “little evidence to suggest a widespread decrease in racially polarized voting in the 
South,” and concluding that “districts that are at least 60% black . . . are most likely to elect a 
black legislator”); Highton, supra note 139, at 5 (citing two studies from 1999 “that find 
substantially lower support for African American candidates among whites”).  
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black and white Democrats against a small minority of wealthy 
Republicans, has been transformed by a modern Republican Party 
that manages to unite many affluent and working class white 
voters.143 
B. National Trends 
A record 58% of whites voted Republican in the 2004 presidential 
election, up from 54% in 2000,144 46% in 1996, and 40% in 1992.145 
Meanwhile, in 2004, 88% of blacks, 56% of Asians, 53% of Latinos, 
and 54% of Native Americans and those voters classified as “other” 
voted Democratic.146 One can posit race neutral explanations for this 
divergence of political allegiances between the dominant white 
majority on the one hand and communities of color on the other. 
Whites tend to have higher incomes and more wealth than blacks and 
Latinos, hence, they are more likely to be attracted to Republican 
economic conservatism. But this does not explain the disconnection 
between economic status and voting patterns. Political scientists who 
have carefully examined a similar political divergence of black and 
white voters in the South conclude that race is the dominant issue. 
They note that both blacks and whites appear to hew to a racial 
interest as opposed to an economic one. Large majorities of Southern 
blacks, regardless of income, identify themselves as core Democrats, 
while core Republicans outnumber core Democrats in every income 
category among Southern whites.147 There is a tight racial 
architecture to politics in the South that, admittedly, has been 
exacerbated by racial gerrymandering. Republicans now dominate in 
the districts that are 0–14% black; they are competitive in the districts 
that are 15–29% black; and they fail in districts with black 
 
 143. See JUDIS & TEIXEIRA, supra note 106, at 62–65.  
 144. CNN.com, Election Results, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/ 
states/US/P/00/epolls.0.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). 
 145. Id.; see also Bob Wing, The White Elephant in the Room: Race and Election 2004, 
BLACK SCHOLAR, Spring 2005, at 16, 16 (noting that the Republicans share of the white vote in 
the 2004 election was 58%, representing “a four-point gain over their share in the election year 
2000; a 12-point gain over 1996 and a grim 18-point gain over 1992”). 
 146. CNN.com, supra note 144 (identifying national elections by race in 2004 and 2000). 
 147. See BLACK & BLACK, supra note 15, at 246–47. 
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populations above 30%.148 This pronounced racial structure 
dramatically shapes how and whether a politician can assemble a 
winning coalition.149 White Republicans can espouse a robust 
conservatism designed to attract substantial white majorities and 
black Democrats can be equally robust liberals.150 The racial 
architecture of Southern politics does not leave much room for 
moderation and it certainly does not encourage cross-racial 
competition for votes or a discourse of racial empathy.  
Situated between the cleavage of Southern blacks and whites are 
Latino voters. For Latinos, unlike with black and white voters, 
economic status is a reliable predictor of partisan loyalties. A low-
income Latino predictably can be expected to vote Democratic, just 
as a high-income Latino is likely to vote Republican.151 Perhaps 
Latino voters, many of whom are immigrants who have lived outside 
of the dominant, tortured racial narrative of black-white opposition in 
the South, feel free to vote their economic interests.152  
The trends of the South are mirrored, although perhaps to a lesser 
degree, in the national electorate. The Republican Party continues to 
make inroads with working class whites and its gains with minority 
voters in the 2004 election, while disputed among pollsters, have 
been modest.153  
Contrary to popular media coverage about President George W. 
Bush’s gains with conservative Christians in the 2004 presidential 
 
 148. Id. at 380. 
 149. Id. at 382. 
 150. Id. at 386. 
 151. See id. at 246–47 (noting that a majority of low-income (65%) and middle-income 
(56%) Hispanics were core Democrats, while a majority of upper-income (69%) Hispanics were 
core Republicans). 
 152. See Harry P. Pachon, The Battle for Latino Voters 2, DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP 
COUNCIL (2002), www.ndol.org (type “Pachon” in search box; follow “The Battle for Latino 
Voters” hyperlink; follow the “Full text of this briefing” hyperlink) (noting that in “a national 
poll, most Latinos said they identified as ‘working families’ rather than any ethnic (Mexican 
American, Cuban American) or pan-ethnic (Hispanic/Latino) group identifications” and that it 
would be “more useful” for political parties “to think of these voters as “‘working class’ rather 
than ‘Latino’”).  
 153. The Republican Party actually lost ground with Latino and Asian voters in the 1990s 
when prominent candidates like Bob Dole championed an English-only requirement and 
Republicans in California and the United States Senate supported punitive measures aimed at 
illegal and legal immigrants. See JUDIS & TEIXEIRA, supra note 117, at 58, 83–84 (discussing, 
inter alia, Proposition 187 to deny public services to children of illegal immigrants). 
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election, he garnered his largest gains with married white women and 
Catholics.154 I am not suggesting that racial differences are the only 
explanation for diverging partisan affinities between whites and 
communities of color. Interestingly, partisan identification has 
remained rather steady over the last three decades.155 What has 
changed is that partisanship has intensified. Incumbents of all races 
and political ideologies have done a good job of propagating 
themselves, such that only a few dozen congressional seats are 
competitive in each election cycle.156 Incumbents running in safe, 
ideologically homogenous districts have little incentive to moderate. 
As such, our political discourse has become much more ideologically 
polarized even as racial polarization has declined. In a context of 
growing racial diversity, however, ideological polarization may 
influence racial division and vice versa, racial division may 
contribute to ideological division.  
In the twenty-first century majority “white America” is going to 
be replaced by “multiracial, multiethnic America.” Inevitably, this 
transition creates social conflict—a conflict of values, of culture, and 
perhaps of political philosophy.157 Some voters, including many 
white ones, embrace diversity as a positive value and want the 
communities they live in, the employers they work for, and the 
governments they vote for to reflect their own openness and 
tolerance.158 They are averse to policies that ostracize particular 
groups, be they gays, illegal immigrants, or racial minorities.159 On 
the other hand, in a “flat world” where globalization is causing a 
great deal of economic pain and dislocation in some communities,160 
growing racial complexity could be experienced as a threat. The 
philosophy of a small, limited, “color blind” government that takes 
no cognizance of racial and ethnic difference, and touts “traditional” 
 
 154. See GALSTON & KAMARCK, supra note 134, at 30. 
 155. Id. at 3 (noting that, on average, over the last thirty years, 20% of voters identify 
themselves as liberal, 33% as conservative, and 47% as moderate; and, similarly, in the 2004 
election, the electorate was 21% liberal, 34% conservative, and 45% moderate).  
 156. See id. at 53. 
 157. See JUDIS & TEIXEIRA, supra note 106, at 6. 
 158. See id. at 73. 
 159. See id. 
 160. See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY (2005). 
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values may have more resonance with voters who feel dislocated or 
disoriented by America’s racial and economic transitions.161  
Admittedly, this is conjecture on my part. These are only theories 
that might explain why many whites and people of color diverge 
politically. However, this divergence, whatever the underlying 
explanations, has both positive and negative implications regarding 
reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act. A positive take on racial 
divergence is that both parties should have a vested interest in 
attracting the growing minority electorate—especially Latinos, who 
comprise the fastest growing population in the United States and do 
not exhibit patterns of racial solidarity in their voting preferences. 
There are certain states, including California, Texas, New Mexico, 
and Florida, where Latino voters could determine the outcome of 
state-wide elections.162 President Bush’s pre-9/11 stances on foreign 
immigration and his recent guest worker proposal suggest that he is 
trying to woo, or placate, Latino voters. Yet there is a pronounced 
gap between the size of the Latino population and its rates of 
citizenship and voter registration, a gap that demographers and 
political scientists expect to continue for the foreseeable future.163 
Hence, in the near term, the incentive to attract minority voters may 
be modest. 
 
 161. JUDIS & TEIXEIRA, supra note 106, at 74–76. 
 162. See Pachon, supra note 152, at 5 (noting that, especially in California, Texas, New 
Mexico, and Florida, “the Hispanic electorate has the clear potential of being the much heralded 
swing vote” because their numbers are enough to translate into a 1% change in the outcome of a 
statewide election); JEFFREY S. PASSEL, URBAN INST. IMMIGRATION STUDIES PROGRAM 
ELECTION 2004: THE LATINO AND ASIAN VOTE 2 (2004), http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/ 
900723.pdf (noting that Latinos account for more than 5% of the electorate in fifteen states and 
that they could play a key role even in battleground states such as Ohio or Wisconsin where 
they constitute only 1–2% of the population). But see James G. Gimpel, Losing Ground or 
Staying Even? Republicans and the Politics of the Latino Vote, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION 
STUDIES, Oct. 2004, http://www.cis.org/articles/2004/back1004.html (noting that the “vast 
majority of Latino voters live in states that [were] not battlegrounds in the [2004] presidential 
race” and predicting that their impact on that election would be modest). 
 163. See JACK CITRIN & BENJAMIN HIGHTON, HOW RACE, ETHNICITY, AND IMMIGRATION 
SHAPE THE CALIFORNIA ELECTORATE, at vi (2002) (noting that low voter participation rates 
among Latino voters in California “are almost entirely a function of reduced citizenship and 
lower socioeconomic status”); PASSEL, supra note 162, at 1 (noting that while Latinos 
represented 12.6% of the population in 2000 they cast only 5.3% of the votes that year, 
compared to whites who were 70% of the population but over 81% of the electorate, and noting 
that only 38% of legal Latino immigrants had naturalized as of 2000, compared to 60% of all 
other immigrants, contributing mightily to the gap in Latino voter participation). 
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A negative take on racial divergence of the electorate is that such 
divisions will be easier to exploit than to transcend. One could argue, 
given the Democratic leanings of communities of color, that growing 
racial diversity of the electorate provides strong incentive for the 
Republican Party to suppress the “minority” or “ethnic” vote while 
attempting to expand its majority with white voters. Several authors, 
including Mark Crispin Miller and Greg Palast, have offered detailed 
expositions of voter suppression efforts by or for the benefit of 
Republicans.164 Readers of such books can judge for themselves the 
prevalence, vel non, of minority voter suppression. The state of 
Georgia’s recent adoption of a law that requires presentation of 
government issued identification in order to vote is a salient example 
of the risks.165 The new law passed swiftly in the Republican-
controlled state legislature and was signed by a Republican governor 
who made the Confederate flag one of his central campaign issues.166 
Under the law, which a federal district court recently held to be in 
violation of the Voting Rights Act,167 those who do not have a 
driver’s license must pay twenty dollars for an identification card.168 
In a state with 159 counties, the cards could only be purchased at one 
of sixty offices of the Department of Motor Vehicles, none of which 
was in the city of Atlanta.169 Under prior law, a voter could present 
any one of seventeen types of identification, including utility bills 
and bank statements.170 The Georgia Secretary of State, a Democrat, 
stated publicly that she did not know of a single case of someone 
trying to impersonate another voter at the polls.171 Despite the clear 
likelihood of poor and minority voters being disproportionately 
affected because they have fewer driver’s licenses, the Bush 
 
 164. See MARK CRISPIN MILLER, FOOLED AGAIN (2005); GREG PALAST, THE BEST 
DEMOCRACY MONEY CAN BUY (2002). 
 165. See Darryl Fears, Voter ID Law is Overturned; Georgia Can No Longer Charge for 
Access to Nov. 8 Election, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2005, at A3. 
 166. Kristen Wyatt, Georgia Sees Competitive Democratic Race, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 
20, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A56825-2004Feb20.html. 
 167. See Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005). 
 168. See Fears, supra note 165. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See id. Fraud is more prevalent with absentee ballots but absentee ballots were not 
covered by the Georgia law. Editorial, Georgia’s New Poll Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, at 
A20.  
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administration “pre-cleared” the law, proclaiming it was in 
compliance with the Voting Rights Act.172 Thus far civil rights 
groups have successfully challenged this provision in court.173 
Ironically, Democrats have been less vigorous than they should be 
on the issue of minority voter suppression, perhaps out of fear of 
being put back in the box of being the party for blacks. Al Gore did 
not press the issue that analysts claim was the most egregious 
potential encroachment on voting rights in the 2000 election in 
Florida—that of erroneous purging of voters with names similar to 
former felons.174 Critics claim that the Republican-controlled Florida 
government intentionally used an overly blunt mechanism to purge 
voters, who were disproportionately minority.175 Again, readers can 
judge for themselves the veracity of these claims. My point is that 
racial divisions continue to infect the quality of American democracy. 
The racially and economically segregated landscape of America, 
coupled with racial and partisan gerrymandering that builds a racial 
architecture into our democracy, creates a continued risk of political 
machinations that, in my view, justify renewing the pre-clearance and 
language minority protections of the Voting Rights Act.  
IV. CONCLUSION: SHALL WE OVERCOME? 
Despite this conclusion, voting rights advocates should 
acknowledge, and attempt to redress, the unintended consequences of 
the Voting Rights Act and racial gerrymandering, as brave scholars 
like Lani Guinier have argued.176 We need to think deeply about how 
we can improve political discourse and structure laws in a way that 
encourages, rather than discourages, interracial alliances. The 
 
 172. The state of Georgia asserted pre-clearance as a defense in Part IV of its initial Brief 
in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Common Cause/Georgia v. 
Billups. State Defendant’s Initial Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at 18, Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005) 
(No. 4:05-CV-201-HLM). 
 173. See Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005). The 
statute was later amended, and the amended version was called into doubt in Common 
Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1296 (N.D. Ga. 2006). 
 174. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 164, at 214–15, 218–24. 
 175. See id.  
 176. See GUINIER, supra note 13. 
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growing success of black elected officials in majority white districts, 
the decline of explicit or covert racial appeals in politics, and the 
growing openness to diversity in American society give me cause for 
hope. One can find pockets of America that seem to have transcended 
traditional race struggles. Two, admittedly Democrat, pollsters write 
of the American “ideopolis”—metropolitan areas that attract the 
creative class, knowledge and high-tech workers, and a population 
that values diversity. In such areas, voters do not display stark 
patterns of race loyalty at the ballot box.177  
As in Wilmington, North Carolina in the 1890s, cross-racial 
alliances and power sharing are possible. In our diverse future such 
alliances will also be essential to creating a healthy democracy that 
will be responsive to the needs of most Americans. As with the 
Republicans during Reconstruction, as with the Democrats during the 
New Deal, and as with the civil rights movement itself, majority 
power can be created out of a positive alliance across boundaries of 
difference.178 Reflecting on American history, the social advances of 
which we are most proud were premised upon optimistic, inclusive 
visions and optimistic, inclusive politics. Shall we overcome our 
historic divisions? I hope so. Elsewhere I have written about the 
labor-intensive educational and institutional challenges to cross-racial 
coalition building.179 In the absence of institutional fora that 
consciously attempt to bridge differences, preferably by establishing 
a convergence of enlightened self-interest, differing racial and ethnic 
groups are not likely to become allies.180 However, in the long 
 
 177. See JUDIS & TEIXEIRA, supra note 106, at 73–74 (citing, inter alia, San Francisco, 
Chicago, and Princeton/Mercer County, New Jersey). But see id. (noting that in metropolitan 
areas like St. Louis, Cleveland, and Detroit politics has been “marked by familiar race and class 
cleavages”).  
 178. My favorite recent example is the multiracial coalition that led to the adoption of the 
“Texas 10 Percent Plan”—the legislation that guarantees admission to the flagship public 
universities of Texas to graduating seniors in the top 10% of every high school in the state. See 
LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING 
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 68–73 (2002). The program, developed by a group of 
Latino and black activists, legislators, and academics, passed in the Texas legislature by one 
vote, after conservative Republican rural members—whose constituents were not regularly 
being admitted to the University of Texas—decided to support the legislation. Id. 
 179. See Cashin, Shall We Overcome?, supra note 3. 
 180. See, e.g., Reuel R. Rogers, Race-Based Coalitions Among Minority Groups: Afro-
Caribbean Immigrants and African-Americans in New York City, 39 URB. AFF. REV. 283, 312 
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term—because of growing diversity—institutions, especially political 
ones, will have no choice but to build interracial alliances. In my 
view, the organizations that succeed in building such alliances, rather 
than exploiting divisions, will dominate in the twenty-first century. I 
hope, dear reader, that you will contribute to an inclusive American 
democracy. 
 
(2004) (concluding that racial commonalities were not enough to overcome inter-minority 
tensions, especially given the absence of an institutional mechanism for building trust and 
relationships among the elite of both groups). 
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